More Union in European Defence.  CEPS Task Force Report, 26 February 2015 by Blockmans, Steven. & Faleg, Giovanni
Centre for European Policy Studies
1 Place du Congrès | 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Tel : 32(0)2.229.39.11 | Fax : 32(0)2.219.41.51
E-mail : info@ceps.eu | Website : www.ceps.eu
 Chair : Javier Solana
 Rapporteurs : Steven Blockmans
  Giovanni Faleg
9 789461 384492
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE
MORE UNION IN 
EUROPEAN DEFENCE
Years of uncoordinated cuts in defence spending have eroded the EU’s role 
as a security actor in what is now a multipolar world. In the face of numerous 
emergencies in the EU’s strategic neighbourhood and ever-present security 
threats, this CEPS Task Force report aims to provide member states and the 
EU institutions with the narrative to strengthen defence cooperation in the EU. 
The Treaty of Lisbon demands and permits a great deal more in terms of our 
common security and defence activities. And member states could achieve 
much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 
28 national armies,  comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel.
This Task Force report is a record of the deliberations over several months 
between high-level experts in the field of European security and defence. 
The report suggests policy actions to further the EU’s strategic, institutional, 
capabilities, and resources cooperation in the field of defence. Ultimately, in 
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The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent think tank based 
in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound policy research leading to constructive 
solutions to the challenges facing Europe today.  
This report is based on the discussions in the CEPS Task Force on European 
security and defence, which met on four separate occasions between June 2014 and 
January 2015. The policy recommendations offered in this report reflect a general 
consensus reached by Task Force members, although not every member agrees 
with every aspect of each recommendation. The members were given the 
opportunity to comment on the draft final report, but its contents may only be 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
umerous emergencies in the European Union’s strategic 
neighbourhood, hybrid security threats, years of uncoordinated 
cuts in defence spending and rapidly evolving global trends have 
all eroded the EU’s role as a security actor in a multipolar world. The 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) needs to be more efficient 
and more effective if it is to meet today’s security challenges and promote 
the EU’s own values and interests. It also needs to fire the imagination of its 
citizens.  
The CEPS Task Force aims to provide the incumbents at the helm of 
the EU institutions, in particular the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), 
with the narrative and the proposals to strengthen defence cooperation in 
the EU. Ultimately, the necessary defence integration should amount to a 
‘European Defence Union’ (EDU). This report defines the shape of such a 
Union as the cornerstone of a comprehensive, civil-military security 
architecture in Europe. Having examined the current and potential 
conditions in the relevant sectors, the CEPS Task Force recommends an 
array of policy actions for further cooperation and integration as the 
natural steps to join all the dots of the defence debate – strategic, 
institutional, capabilities, and resources. 
Main recommendations 
Strategic upgrade: 
 Drawing on the High Representative’s work on a new European 
foreign policy strategy, define common interests that take account of 
the fluidity of threats and opportunities in the EU’s rapidly changing 
neighbourhood, in a multipolar world. 
 Use the military as a catalyst for an integral approach to the 
performance of the treaty tasks geared at conflict prevention, crisis 
management and peacebuilding. 
 Focus on a contribution to territorial defence complementary to 
NATO and a political and military ability to autonomously conduct 
intervention operations beyond the EU’s borders. 
N 
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Reform of institutions, procedures and financing: 
 Use the treaty basis for permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) to 
move European defence integration forward with a group of like-
minded states. 
 Improve high-level decision-making by i) introducing a biennial 
regularity in the defence debate by the European Council; ii) 
establishing a ministerial forum for consultation and decision-
making, leading to the formation of a dedicated Council of Defence 
Ministers; and iii) upgrading the EP Subcommittee on Security and 
Defence to a fully fledged Committee. 
 Establish permanent EU military headquarters in Brussels. 
 Substantially increase levels of common funding for EU operations 
and elaborate alternative funding options for EDU member states 
(joint financing, trust funds).  
Capabilities and industrial harmonisation: 
 Introduce a ‘European Semester’ for member states’ defence budgets 
and capability development plans to enhance mutual transparency 
and accountability.  
 Call for an industry/government/institutions summit to try and re-
galvanise the EU’s industrial and technological agenda.  
 
The European Council should appoint an independent committee, 
supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the 
relevant branches of the European Commission acting under the authority 
of the HR/VP, to propose a roadmap of practical and realistic steps for the 
implementation of these recommendations in stages, involving the 
attainment of harmonisation criteria and mandatory milestones for 
upgrades in each basket of reform. 
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If not now, when? 
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the weakest link in the 
European integration project. Longstanding obstacles block further 
integration, such as differences between member states in threat 
perceptions and strategic cultures, divergences in intentions and 
preferences and, in some cases, lack of mutual trust and solidarity. Yet the 
Lisbon Treaty demands and permits a great deal more in terms of our 
common security and defence activities. 
Jean Monnet has taught us that “Europe will be forged in crises, and 
will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”. Multiple 
emergencies and rapidly evolving global trends have undermined the 
European Union’s role as a security actor in recent years. The implications 
have been threefold. 
Firstly, rather than being surrounded by a ring of friends, the EU is 
now faced with an arc of instability stretching from the Sahel to the Horn 
of Africa, through the Middle East and the Caucasus up to the new 
frontlines in eastern Europe. Moreover, the evolution in the multipolar 
security environment has led to a diversification of security threats that 
spread across political, social and economic dimensions and are 
increasingly interconnected. These threats are not purely military in nature 
but range from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to 
cyber-attacks, piracy, the actions of ethno-nationalist groups with 
subversive intentions, and threats to energy and environmental security. 
Spurred by the effects of globalisation they easily transcend state borders 
and are no longer unique to certain geographical regions. Radicalisation in 
the EU and extremism in the neighbourhood act as ‘communicating 
vessels’ and blur the difference between what is internal or external to the 
EU. And just as terrorist threats and cyber-attacks affect all member states, 
hybrid warfare is neither new nor exclusive to Russia. 
Russia’s infiltrations in Ukraine and provocations to member states’ 
territorial water and air defences have, however, delivered a blow to 
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Europe’s post-Cold War security order and have revived awareness in the 
EU about the possibility of military attack and occupation in Europe. Policy 
reactions have differed, however, with some member states defending their 
neutrality and others deepening their military cooperation with NATO 
allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia’s shock to the system has also 
exposed the fragility of gas supplies and, as a consequence, propelled EU 
policy action towards the creation of an Energy Union. At the same time, 
however, some member states have struck up new arrangements for 
cooperation with Russia in the field of nuclear energy. While the clichéd 
perception that France only looks to the south and Germany to the east is 
certainly not true with respect to the threats posed by the jihadi 
totalitarianism of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic State’ in 
Iraq and Syria, it is nevertheless clear that, in the age of globalisation, 
geography still matters. Whereas Central and Eastern Europe is exercised 
by Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, EU member states in the south worry 
more about the violent implosion of Libya and the challenges posed by 
waves of illegal migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Thus, the divergent 
threat perceptions and security interests of member states have prevented 
the emergence of a common strategic culture and hampered the creation of 
joint structures, procedures and assets at the EU level. By national navel-
gazing, member states’ political leaders are not only in denial of threats 
faced throughout the EU, they also underestimate the degree of expectation 
among the European public, which for the past ten years has consistently 
polled over 70% in favour of a broad European project in the area of 
defence. 
Secondly, the financial crisis and ensuing austerity measures have 
considerably weakened military capabilities and resources in EU member 
states. In the absence of an external threat after the fall of the Iron Curtain, 
and in the face of rising costs of modern weapons platforms and public 
scepticism about the role of the military, governments have found it more 
difficult to maintain previous levels of defence spending or to contribute to 
operations abroad. Defence budgets have been slashed in an uncoordinated 
and uneven manner in recent years. That said, EU member states still 
spend more than €190bn combined to keep up 28 national armies 
comprising roughly 1.5 million service personnel. Sadly, there are huge 
inefficiencies, due to duplication of capacities, platforms and systems, with 
low levels of interoperability. As a result, governments have become less 
capable of deploying military force in conflict theatres.  
Austerity has affected the CSDP as well. Although the policy has 
been on a steep learning curve since its inception in the early 2000s, the 
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CSDP ‘brand’ has hit a glass ceiling: held back by a lack of political 
leadership, institutional complexities, insufficient coordination at the 
planning and operational levels, and member states’ reluctance to provide 
troops and kit, the EU appears unable to move beyond missions that are 
limited in scope, size and time. The EU is falling short of expectations in 
acting as an effective security provider in larger, more complex and longer-
term missions in higher-risk theatres (e.g. EUPOL Afghanistan, EULEX 
Kosovo), and it was absent when robust and rapid reaction to crises was 
needed (e.g. in Libya and Mali). There are, of course, exceptions to the rule,  
notably the ongoing efforts to counter piracy in the Horn of Africa through 
maritime security – EUNAVFOR Atalanta, and regional capacity-building 
to combat security threats, terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration 
(e.g. EUCAP Sahel Niger). But in spite of more than ten years of learning by 
doing, the EU is currently not able to enhance the security of its citizens or 
to contribute effectively to countering threats and breaches of peace and 
stability in its strategic neighbourhood, or indeed in the wider world. 
Without a strong military arm, the EU cannot live up to its self-imposed 
duty to project security and development, or meet the expectations of its 
citizens and international partners like the United Nations to provide 
added value by operationalising its comprehensive approach to conflict 
prevention, crisis management and peace-building. While in recent years 
the EU has made great progress in its civilian contribution to such 
multidimensional missions, these advances alone remain insufficient.  
Thirdly, new economic and demographic forces in Asia have pulled 
the world’s economic centre of gravity away from Europe. The global 
landscape of defence spending is changing accordingly. The US remains 
the world’s only military superpower in terms of defence spending (almost 
five times that of the runner-up, China); sophistication of hard- and 
software; battle-tested experience and global reach. Whereas Washington’s 
European allies still rank highly in defence spending and manpower, the 
trend is unmistakable: the emerging economies are closing the gap and 
replacing developed countries in the top tier. The newly gained confidence 
of emerging powers to protect and assert their interests regionally and 
globally will naturally lead to more tension and insecurity. The US 
administration’s Asia ‘rebalancing’ may also have a negative impact on 
European security. Individually and collectively, EU member state 
governments have long been in denial about their gradual loss of influence 
on the world stage and the dangers this poses to the security of their 
countries and citizens. The British drift towards an exit from the EU is a 
pronounced example of such a perilous denial.  
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Increased cooperation between member states and the development 
of a strong, integrated defence industry are prerequisites to enhancing the 
EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to act as a security provider on the 
international stage. A rationalisation of EU defence cooperation is likely to 
spill over to NATO too. Whereas the United States opposed the 
development of distinct defence structures within the EU a decade ago, 
their establishment has since become a matter of course. Of the 28 EU 
member states, 22 are NATO allies. Action to improve the EU’s own 
defences would simultaneously strengthen Europe’s influence within 
NATO and enhance the credibility of the Transatlantic Alliance, thus 
preventing it from descending into what former US Secretary of Defence 
Robert Gates famously described as “collective military irrelevance”.  
In sum, the EU (institutions and member states alike) faces an 
endogenous and exogenous-driven demand for a thorough re-arrangement 
of its security and defence cooperation. The existential crisis in which the 
CSDP finds itself provides a unique opportunity to achieve greater 
rationalisation and deeper integration in the EU’s security and defence 
sectors. If now is not the moment for bold steps in European defence 
integration, then when? 
Modest progress 
Answering this historic call for change, the December 2013 Summit marked 
the European Council’s first thematic debate on CSDP since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty. Under the rallying cry “Defence Matters”, the 
Heads of State and Government insisted on the political relevance of 
cooperation in this domain. They implicitly acknowledged the 
ineffectiveness of EU policy by highlighting the rapidly evolving strategic 
and geopolitical environment, member states’ limited ability to deploy and 
sustain forces due to constrained defence budgets, and the fact that 
fragmented defence markets jeopardise the competitiveness of the EU’s 
defence industry.  
In an effort to turn the tide, the European Council “invite[d] the High 
Representative, in close cooperation with the Commission, to assess the 
impact of changes in the global environment, and to report [back] in the 
course of 2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, 
following consultations with the Member States”. High Representative 
Federica Mogherini has since responded to this invitation by announcing, 
on her 100th day in office, a process of strategic reflection to guide the EU’s 
foreign and security policy. 
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The European Council also encouraged member states to strive for 
more systematic and longer-term cooperation in the development, 
maintenance and operation of military capabilities. Military ‘pooling and 
sharing’ (P&S) has gained ground as the only formula against a dangerous 
retreat from security provision. The initiatives launched by the European 
Defence Agency (EDA), and spurred by NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit and 
its launch of a ‘Smart Defence’ agenda, have further mainstreamed P&S. 
Pooling and sharing now has widespread support across the EU, in ways 
thought unrealistic a few years ago. The European Council identified four 
critical domains for the development of joint projects: air-to-air refuelling, 
the development of the next generation of surveillance drones, satellite 
communications and cyber defence. In order to maintain and further 
develop member states’ capabilities, leaders also backed efforts to 
strengthen the EU’s internal market for defence and to promote a more 
integrated, sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence 
technological and industrial base. 
Since December 2013, member states have adopted an EU Strategy for 
Security at Sea, an EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, and a Policy 
Framework for Systematic and Long-Term Defence Cooperation that will 
guide member states when developing defence capabilities – “in full 
coherence with existing NATO planning processes”. Meanwhile, the 
European Commission is exploring the possibility of fostering synergies 
between civil and military research by using the general budget to fund 
dual-use projects, as part of its industrial action plan released in July 2013 
under the fitting title ‘A New Deal for European Defence’. As tasked by the 
December 2013 European Council, the Commission and the EDA have 
initiated a debate on research related to the CSDP and the ‘Preparatory 
Action’ in this field, which is expected to be launched in 2017. 
While these decisions and initiatives hint at promising developments 
for the future of European security and defence, they are still in the 
experimental phase and, in and of themselves, fail to provide the CSDP 
with a sound vision to effectively meet current and future challenges. 
Progress in the four areas mentioned above will be evaluated by the 
European Council in June 2015 and will be a real credibility test. 
Assurances that ‘work is in hand’ must not suffice. EU leaders should seize 
the opportunity to go beyond the modest agenda set out so far, agree on a 
higher level of ambition to create a more integrated framework for their 
defence cooperation, and be more specific and demanding in its reporting 
requirements (e.g. by asking for costed plans to achieve these ambitions 
within strict timeframes). 
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Towards a more Integrated Framework: A European 
Defence Union 
The CEPS Task Force believes that the heightened challenges call for 
unprecedented steps in the realm of European security and defence 
integration, which will contribute positively to the political fate of the 
European Union. A new integrative process is needed to overcome the 
cleavages we observe across several lines, ranging from the differing sizes, 
strategic interests, and willingness to use force demonstrated by EU 
countries. Add to this their varying degrees of participation in the CSDP 
and levels of trust and solidarity with one another. Advances in the field of 
defence cooperation are possible only if greater strategic convergence is 
achieved, and the model of governance evolves from the current CSDP set-
up to a more suitable architecture to manage these internal divisions. 
Externally, the challenge is to send clear signals to neighbours and partners 
about the EU’s global ambitions in the coming decades and, most 
importantly, its ability to live up to its declared ambitions. 
Sixty-five years after the Plan Pleven to create a European Defence 
Community, member states need to formulate and elaborate a bold vision 
for EU defence integration consistent with current concerns about security 
environment and austerity. This vision takes into account calls for a 
recalibration of EU defence efforts and, consequently, the Union’s resilience 
and reputation as an autonomous security provider in its neighbourhood 
and beyond. We brand this new framework the ‘European Defence 
Union’ (EDU). In much the same way as the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the proposed Energy Union are the end goals of full 
European integration in their respective fields, the EDU proclaims the 
finalité of EU integration in the area of defence. It calls for a unified strategic 
process, more effective institutions, an array of more integrated and 
interoperable armed forces, a common budget, and a single and 
competitive defence market.  
The process leading to the creation of the EDU begins with a vision 
that translates into concrete policy actions that European leaders should 
discuss and agree upon to move defence integration forward. Both are 
outlined in this report. In order to move from the blueprint to the launch of 
the EDU, the European Council, acting upon the proposal of an 
independent committee appointed by it and supported by the European 
EEAS and the relevant branches of the European Commission under the 
authority of the HR/VP, should define a roadmap with practical and 
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realistic steps and implement the plan in stages, similar to the approach to 
the creation of the EMU.  
The following pages lay the foundations of the EDU, structured in six 
sections: 1) the shape of defence cooperation; 2) learning by doing; 3) key 
strategic trends; 4) crisis scenarios for EU interventions; 5) military 
capabilities; and 6) budget and market. The Task Force’s recommendations 
for an EDU framework follow on from the analysis below.  
1. The shape of defence cooperation 
European security and defence is currently characterised by an increasing 
variety of cooperation across the three dimensions: strategy, capabilities, 
and operations. The absence of a core group of member states has resulted 
in ‘silos’ of cooperation across loosely connected regional or geopolitical 
clusters. From an observation of member states’ security and defence 
policies over the past five years, four patterns of behaviour can be detected:  
Unilateralism: individual member states take action without 
considering pluri- or multilateral options within the CSDP framework, or 
close coordination with EU partners. This behaviour mainly affects the 
CSDP in strategic and operational terms. The decision of the Netherlands to 
give up its heavy armour is a case in point. France’s intervention in Mali in 
2013 was borne out of the need to bypass complex and slow decision-
making procedures in the CSDP. Paris subsequently asked other member 
states for complementary instruments, which some of them provided in 
their own time. 
Bilateral ententes: two member states deepen their defence cooperation. 
This phenomenon has mostly occurred in the realm of capabilities 
generation and in the planning and conduct of operations. Such 
cooperation may contribute to CSDP (e.g. Belgian-Dutch naval 
cooperation), but may also risk undermining it, as shown by the different 
approaches of France and the UK to implement the 2010 Lancaster House 
Treaties.  
Patchy multilateralism: member states advance their defence cooperation 
in groups, out of mutual trust, geographic or cultural proximity, and/or 
common threats. This behaviour has emerged in capabilities generation, for 
example, through new initiatives aimed at fostering pooling and sharing 
within regional sub-groups (e.g. NORDEFCO, CEDC).  
Ad hoc coalitions: this phenomenon has proliferated because of member 
states’ reluctance to deploy unless led (or at least, as in Libya, underpinned) 
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by the United States. The same trend can be observed elsewhere. In NATO, 
for instance, ad hoc coalitions are usually prompted by the US requesting 
operational support, as in the case of airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq.  
The variable geometry of European defence cooperation should be 
streamlined in order to strengthen the ambitions-capabilities nexus, all the 
while respecting member states’ decisions about the appropriate level of 
execution of national sovereignty. Able and willing member states should 
use the full potential of Article 44 TEU to give more flexibility to EU action 
in the operational field, and the PESCO mechanism provided by Article 46 
TEU for capability aspects, defined by a set of criteria that distinguish 
themselves from those included in Protocol No. 10 to the Lisbon Treaty (see 
Appendix). Any member state that wishes to participate in the permanent 
structured cooperation at a later stage will of course be welcome to join, 
provided it fulfils the criteria and has made the commitments on military 
capabilities.  
2. Learning by doing 
Against the backdrop of a variable security architecture, important lessons 
have been drawn from the EU’s operational experience – or lack thereof – 
in three areas of strategic interest: the eastern neighbourhood, the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), and the Sahel. 
In the eastern neighbourhood, the EU’s inability to anticipate 
Russia’s shock to Europe’s (as indeed the international) security order 
constitutes a major lesson for the immediate future. In spite of the Russo-
Georgian war of August 2008 and the dubious role of Russia in the 
breakaway republics scattered across the eastern neighbourhood, a certain 
naïveté about geostrategic thinking in Russia, the EU’s biggest and – in 
military terms – most powerful neighbour, led the EU to implement a 
technocratic association programme of institutional and economic reform 
for Eastern Partnership countries. Effective security sector reform (SSR), 
with special emphasis on the defence and intelligence sectors, was not 
included. Moreover, the lack of crisis response readiness, willingness and 
capabilities on the side of the EU has been painfully exposed at various 
junctures of the crisis in Ukraine: there was no agreement among member 
states to dispatch an EU observer or police mission to Crimea or eastern 
Ukraine to investigate or deter Russian infiltrations; the EEAS’ Crisis 
Platform was not convened after the downing of flight MH17, leaving the 
Netherlands to its own devices to coordinate a forensic intervention with 
the Australians. And the token civilian EU Advisory Mission on SSR in 
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Ukraine signals weakness rather than resolve in the face of Russia’s 
military leadership from behind in the east of the country. 
As in Ukraine, the explosion of violence has revealed the EU’s lack of 
preparedness and willingness to intervene in the MENA region. Poor 
intelligence gathering and/or sharing, a failure of geostrategic analysis, 
and a lack of political solidarity are all to blame. The lessons for future EU 
engagement with the MENA region demand a greater differentiation in 
relations with neighbouring countries and an awareness of wider 
geostrategic and geo-economic trends – in effect infusing foreign policy 
proper into the technocratic European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and 
upgrading the ENP toolbox with rapid-reaction capabilities drawn from the 
CSDP.  
In the Sahel, despite the EU’s efforts to strengthen states’ capacities to 
tackle terrorism in the region, jihadi groupings still operate with relative 
ease across international boundaries and none of the governments is able to 
fully control its territory. Mali is a case in point, as are Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. While in the short term further efforts are 
needed to strengthen the local forces across all sectors (intelligence, police, 
military, judiciary), in the long term the root causes of terrorism: corruption 
and governance failure, must be addressed. The EU’s ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’ to security and development is in need of proper 
implementation. 
3. Strategic trends (2015-2030) 
As the global strategic landscape changes, the following factors are likely to 
be a primary source of insecurity and instability at the EU’s borders, as well 
as on European soil, in the next 15 years:  
- a new balance of power caused by a shift in the world’s economic 
and political centre of gravity from the northern Atlantic towards 
Asia, a population explosion in Africa, and the opening of sea lanes in 
the Arctic, to name but a few, entails changing geopolitical dynamics, 
strategic uncertainty and a progressive substitution of European 
countries as the leading military powers;  
- technological advances as a source of fragmentation and 
vulnerability in global security. Risks include the exposure of critical 
infrastructures to cybercrime and cyber warfare, but also the impact 
on access and use of new technologies in inter- and intra-state 
conflicts, terrorism, state fragility and illicit trafficking; 
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- hybrid warfare, i.e. a mixture of special forces, information 
campaigns and backdoor proxies; 
- the enduring threat of jihadi extremism, both in the form of the 
radicalisation of disenfranchised people within EU borders and the 
reinforcement of terrorist organisations active in fragile countries 
within its strategic neighbourhood;  
- the likelihood of large-scale regional conflict in the Middle East and 
the spill-over of intra-state wars in Africa due to various causes, 
including further political upheaval; the increased power of non-state 
actors, backed up by arch-rival states across the Sunni/Shia divide; 
intra-Sunni strife; economic stress; deteriorating infrastructures; 
extreme climate volatility and natural disasters; resource shortages 
(water, food); and mass migrations.  
4. Crisis scenarios 
The EU’s ‘strategic neighbourhood’ must be understood as a space that 
includes not only the geographical neighbourhood, but also broader areas 
that are functionally linked to vital European interests. As action in the 
EU’s strategic neighbourhood is likely to become more demanding, and 
with the US refocusing its attention on Asia Pacific, the EU should be 
prepared to undertake the full breadth of the ‘Petersberg tasks’. Named 
after the place near Bonn where they were first drawn up, these tasks 
include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping 
tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making 
and post-conflict stabilisation” (Article 43 TEU). It is by using its military 
means to perform the tasks at the higher end of the spectrum, including the 
inaptly named ‘peace-making’ (read: peace enforcement), that the EU will 
be better able to serve its strategic interests and gain credibility as a security 
provider in a volatile neighbourhood and beyond. The military serves as a 
catalyst to an integral approach to EU external action when engaging in 
conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding. This is 
particularly so given the fluidity of today’s crisis scenarios and the 
multipolarity of the security environment. 
In the event of a territorial attack on the ‘homeland’ of the EU by 
conventional or subversive means, EU defence should play a 
complementary role to that performed by NATO under Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty. This scenario should also apply to the EU member 
states which are not members of the Alliance. Such support could take the 
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form of intelligence sharing and assistance to military SSR in the countries 
concerned. EU support should also be given in peace time.  
Insofar as threats require a more expeditionary reaction, for instance 
to prevent or in response to a humanitarian emergency, or in order to put 
an end to crimes against humanity in a civil war-like scenario occurring in 
a fragile country, the EU should use its military assets to live up to its 
responsibility to protect, preferably acting on behalf of and/or alongside 
the United Nations.  
5. Military capabilities 
To reach military autonomy and the ability to intervene in the strategic 
neighbourhood when required, the EU should meet two general targets:  
i) capacity to support NATO and Nordic, Baltic, Central and Eastern 
European countries in deterring and countering conventional and 
hybrid warfare tactics. This entails capabilities for identifying, 
evaluating and responding to threats through a mix of special, 
permanent and rapid reaction forces, cyber defence and public 
diplomacy; and 
ii) political and military autonomy to conduct intervention operations 
in order to respond to or deter crises. Such operations will typically 
be conducted in partnership with regional actors, regional 
organisations or the UN to protect, inter alia, respect for fundamental 
rights, the rule of law, the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law, as indeed the Union’s own fundamental 
interests, security and independence (cf. Article 21 TEU). This 
includes rapid deployment task forces across the three components 
(air, navy, and army), sustainable logistics, satellite communications, 
and security of supplies. 
In planning future capabilities, emphasis should therefore be placed 
on the functions performed by European armed forces, building on the two 
broad targets described above. For intervention operations, the emphasis 
should be on those high-end, rapid-response and ‘enabling’ capabilities 
that partners such as the UN or regional organisations typically lack. In 
today’s security environment, the quality of capabilities – defined by the 
level of ambition and the strategic goals – matters more than the quantity. 
As the current state of EU defence demonstrates, the sum of small, ill-
equipped and expensive national armies does not allow the member states 
to autonomously manage crises in their neighbourhood. The EU therefore 
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needs to boost the quality of its military enablers for comprehensive 
operations.  
Key enablers are the presence of up-and-running command and 
control systems; joint intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance (ISTAR) to gather and assess information at the strategic 
and tactical levels (e.g. through EU delegations, naval and air task forces, 
including drones); strategic and tactical airlift and air-to-air refuelling to 
ensure mobility; precision-strike capabilities for all branches of the armed 
forces (from special forces to adequate supplies of smart munitions).  
Defence planning should also include specific capability sets to 
guarantee the effectiveness of comprehensive action across the whole 
spectrum of threats. For instance, crisis response or deterrence in the east 
requires support for NATO stand-by forces stationed near the external 
borders of the EU for deterrence and reassurance purposes; state-of-the-art 
capabilities for offensive and defensive cyber warfare; and special forces to 
be employed to counter ethno-nationalist groups attempting subversive 
actions.  
In addition to the deployment of combat-ready rapid reaction or 
intervention forces, a package of structural measures should include 
medical, engineering and logistics capabilities under unified command 
(leading to the creation of, inter alia, a European Medical Command), as 
well as diplomatic efforts to support a political peace process. Any post-
conflict stabilisation or peacebuilding intervention will need to ensure 
civilian deployments for training, mentoring and capacity-building (e.g. 
police missions, rule of law missions, SSR, DDR) protected for an initial 
period by a sustained military presence – following the model of NATO’s 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo.  
6. Budget and market 
Shared capability generation efforts needed to sustain the above-mentioned 
tasks are obviously subject to overriding financial, technological, and 
industrial challenges. From a financial standpoint, the generation of the full 
range of capabilities suggested above would entail, for most member states, 
a sharp rise in military spending, even going beyond NATO’s Wales 
Summit pledge of moving towards 2% of GDP by 2024, which would be 
politically unacceptable due to the dire state of their economies. 
Conversely, EU member states spend a combined total of around €190bn to 
keep up 28 national armies. Instead of increasing funding to perpetuate 
existing inefficiencies, member states should cut duplications of capacities, 
MORE UNION IN EUROPEAN DEFENCE | 13 
 
platforms and systems with low levels of interoperability. A financial 
framework of €190bn used in an efficient manner would ensure the EU 
substantially more value for money. In short, efficiencies resulting from a 
rationalisation of national capabilities and new savings are the 
precondition for engaging in ambitious and new collaborative programmes 
through the EU. 
So far, member states have shown reluctance to coordinate, let alone 
harmonise, their defence planning efforts. But deeper defence integration 
will not happen unless at least some member states are prepared to give 
each other greater visibility of what they plan to spend on defence and how 
they plan to spend it – a process of ‘mutual accountability’ without which 
the big cooperative opportunities will be missed.  
Technology is part of the problem. Despite the obvious advantages of 
combined R&D programmes in terms of reducing costs per member state, 
innovation and enhancement of military technology tend to remain 
national prerogatives as long as states, especially those with a big industrial 
base, are unwilling to lose know-how and their technological advantage. 
Moreover, governments are often unwilling to accept the political risk of 
engaging in ambitious and expensive cooperative programmes with other 
states, as implications in terms of loss of sovereignty and limitations to 
their strategic interests or cultures (i.e. when deciding to use military force) 
may be politically unacceptable. Seen through this prism, the conclusions 
of the December 2013 European Council should be welcomed. As part of its 
‘A New Deal for European Defence’, the European Commission is now 
exploring possible synergies between civil and military research by using 
the general budget to fund dual-use projects. As argued above, the 
European Council of June 2015 should define a higher level of ambition to 
create a more integrated framework for EU defence cooperation, and it 
should be more specific and demanding in its reporting requirements. 
Key to all this will be greater strategic convergence, leading 
Europeans to fully recognise the link between the inevitable restructuring 
of their armed forces in the short term (which is already happening 
through defence spending reviews carried out in most member states) and 
the long-term added value of pooling and sharing military capabilities in 
terms of sustainability and effectiveness. Without a common agreement on 
which capabilities can be scrapped, which new ones should be developed 
together and for what purpose, the suggested targets are unlikely to be 
attained in the next ten to fifteen years.  
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Recommendations 
The EDU framework should be designed as a gradual integrative process to 
develop new habits of cooperation based on strategic convergence, while 
developing an EU vision for a better and more efficient cooperation in 
security and defence and setting concrete measures and deadlines to 
achieve this goal. The CEPS Task Force proposes a number of concrete 
policy actions across three baskets to boost EU defence cooperation: 1) 
strategic upgrade; 2) reform of institutions, procedures and financing; and 
3) capabilities and industrial harmonisation. 
1. Strategic upgrade 
This basket deals with the EU’s strategic objectives, level of ambition and 
policy frameworks required to sustain a European Defence Union:  
 Develop a new European Security Strategy, in the context of the 
broader strategic review of EU foreign policy currently being 
orchestrated by the High Representative in response to the December 
2013 European Council mandate. The need is to define common 
interests and a common understanding of what capabilities are likely 
to be required and for what purposes in the years ahead. This will 
need to take account of the fluidity of threats and opportunities in the 
EU’s rapidly changing neighbourhood, in a multipolar world. 
 Define the level of ambition, i.e. the full use of assets to carry out 
‘Petersberg tasks’, with military assets at the high end of the 
spectrum playing a catalytic role in an integral approach to conflict 
prevention, crisis management and post-conflict peacebuilding.  
 Decide on the focus to support such a level of ambition: i) a 
contribution to territorial defence complementary to NATO; and ii) a 
political and military ability to autonomously conduct intervention 
operations beyond the EU’s borders.  
2. Reform of institutions, procedures and financing  
This basket deals with the institutional reform needed to steer the EDU:  
 Use the PESCO mechanism provided in the treaties to manage the 
geometry of cooperation within the EDU across regional clusters to 
ensure interoperability and strategic coherence between national 
armed forces (see Appendix).  
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 Improve high-level decision-making by introducing regularity in 
the defence debate within the main institutional structures of the EU: 
o introduce a biennial thematic session on CSDP in the European 
Council to offer strategic guidance for further EU defence 
cooperation;  
o establish a permanent forum for consultation and decision-
making between defence ministers of member states committed 
to the creation of the EDU (a ‘Defence Group’), gradually leading 
to the formation of a dedicated Council of Defence Ministers;  
o upgrade the Subcommittee for Security and Defence in the 
European Parliament to a fully fledged Committee to enhance  
transparency and accountability of EDU decision-making; and  
o strengthen the consultation procedures between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments on defence matters. 
 Enhance operational effectiveness by i) creating permanent EU 
military headquarters in Brussels to ensure quick and effective 
planning, command and control without relying on NATO or 
member states’ ad hoc structures; and ii) improving the EU liaison 
with NATO by deputising in the International Military Staff (IMS) 
and by integrating an IMS deputy within the EU Military Staff. 
 Strengthen institutional coherence and consistency by better 
integrating the CSDP bodies in the EEAS structures by, inter alia, i) 
linking them up to the geographical divisions; ii) facilitating the flow 
of information (at headquarters and between Brussels and the field); 
iii) and assigning full-time responsibility for CSDP to a Deputy 
Secretary General.  
 Improve EU public diplomacy on CSDP and the need for an EDU, 
both internally (European public opinion) and externally (relations 
with third countries and other international organisations). 
 Revise financing mechanisms to improve fast deployability and 
adequate support to EU operations. A bigger common budget – 
through strengthening and mainstreaming ATHENA as the EDU 
military budget – should be complemented by other funding 
mechanisms, including ‘Joint Financing’, EU trust funds, project cells 
within military missions and operations, and reimbursable services. 
Financial incentives should also be established to foster the creation 
of clusters of cooperation for pooling and sharing (P&S) military 
assets (e.g. logistics and facilities, medical services, force protection). 
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3. Capabilities and industrial harmonisation  
This basket deals with the actions needed to support a coherent and 
effective process of shared capability generation under the P&S framework:  
 Establish PESCO within the mandate of the European Defence 
Agency (see Appendix). 
 Introduce a ‘European Semester’ for member states’ defence budget 
and capability development plans. Whilst no member state will agree 
to submit such plans for ‘approval’, full transparency and openness 
to the comments and suggestions of partners are vital for more 
effective defence cooperation. 
 Standardise methodologies and costing frameworks for member 
states’ defence planning and capability inputs, under the guidance 
and supervision of the EDA and in full coherence with NATO. The 
full harmonisation and integration of defence planning will 
ultimately be necessary to establish a coherent framework for P&S 
and ensure deployability and interoperability for future EU 
operations. 
 Within the framework provided by PESCO, scale up P&S 
capabilities according to the new level of ambition (see Section 5, 
above). 
 Call for an industry/governments/institutions summit to try to re-
galvanise the industrial and technological agenda and create a truly 
European defence technological and industrial base as something 
more than the sum of its national parts, with market forces helping to 
consolidate both the demand and the supply sides. This should be 
supported by giving full implementation to the European 
Commission’s proposals included in its 2013 ‘A New Deal for 
European Defence’, in particular: i) the funding of dual-use projects 
to find new synergies between military and civilian research; ii) the 
support to European defence research; and iii) the completion of the 
single market for defence and security. As such, the strategic 
autonomy for the European defence industry and its competitiveness 
worldwide should be enhanced.  
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Conclusion 
In view of the grave threats posed to the security and defence of the 
European Union, it is high time that member states took bold and concrete 
steps towards a more efficient and effective framework for military 
cooperation. The cost implications of non-Europe in defence – currently 
estimated at €26 billion per year in a 2013 European Parliament Report – 
could rise to €130 billion as the security environment in the EU’s strategic 
neighbourhood worsens. In addition to the obvious economic costs, 
political, moral and strategic imperatives urge the EU to step up its efforts 
in defence cooperation.  
We firmly believe that the time has come for the creation of a 
European Defence Union that supports NATO in its task to provide 
territorial defence. An ambitious EU foreign policy aimed at reducing 
instability and state fragility at the Union’s borders will take on and live up 
to security responsibilities in the strategic neighbourhood through the use 
of military force and rapid response as needed. It will also stimulate 
investment in innovative research programmes, leading to the creation of a 
competitive defence and technological industrial base. Increased unity is 
the only road to greater EU resilience in a changing world.  
The European Council should define a roadmap with practical and 
realistic steps to move, by stages, from the blueprint to the launch of the 
EDU. To that end, EU leaders should appoint an independent committee, 
supported by the EEAS and the relevant branches of the European 
Commission acting under the authority of the HR/VP, to propose such a 
roadmap, similar to the approach to create the EMU and involving the 
attainment of harmonisation criteria and mandatory milestones for 
upgrades in each basket of reform. Although the process of bringing 
European armies to a more structured cooperation and, where appropriate, 
closer integration will certainly be a complex one, the numerous crises 
facing Europe have made change possible. These crises also offer an 
opportunity to secure a more peaceful and prosperous future for the EU.  
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Appendix: Revision of the PESCO Mechanism 
The objective 
Within the framework of the EDA a Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) 
on defence capabilities, open to all EU members states, will be established to 
ensure that member states joining this cooperation will be able to make full use of 
the potential granted by the Treaty to the EDA and, via the EDA, will be able to 
mobilise all other relevant stakeholders and instruments within the Union. 
The overall objective is to gain effectiveness and efficiency in capability 
development. The focus will first be on defence planning, in particular on 
capability development and on pooled procurement. The aim is to fill up the 
strategic shortfalls and to eliminate redundancies the EU level and to reduce costs 
for the participating member states.  
The criterion 
The sole criterion for member states to join this Permanent Structured Cooperation 
is to commit to a mind-set; to be convinced that they can enhance their national 
sovereignty by developing their national defence planning as part and parcel of a 
joint endeavour with partners, by forging “a capability generation community” 
favouring pooled procurement and programmes commonly managed from cradle 
to grave. A persistent political will to favour permanent consultation and 
cooperation on military capabilities is paramount, as is the respect of national 
sovereignty throughout this endeavour. It is all about enhancing or even 
rebuilding it at a level consistent with the magnitude of the common objective, 
turning the EU into a global actor and a security provider.  
Structures 
A Steering Board of Defence Ministers of participating member states in this 
Permanent Structured Cooperation will be established. Much like the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), defence ministers will elect among peers a permanent 
chairman to co-preside the Steering Board together with the High Representative. 
In addition, a specific board at the level of national authorities responsible for 
defence/capability planning and procurement will be established to ensure 
preparatory works. 
Policies 
Participating member states will commit themselves to apply to the fullest extent 
all EDA policy documents, including the recommendations, i.e. on a policy 
framework on systematic and long-term defence cooperation and on codes of 
conduct. These documents will be considered as a base-line for further 
cooperation, not as suggestions to be considered occasionally.  
22 | REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
 
Planning 
Whenever participating member states are in the process of revisiting national 
defence planning, full transparency will be offered to all and to the EDA. Likewise, 
whenever at national level a White Paper on defence is drafted, partners and the 
EDA and will be invited to take part in the process.  
These harmonisation processes will gradually lead to the publication of a 
common EU White Paper on defence capabilities, collecting chapters from 
individual member states, alongside chapters on common endeavours and on the 
results PESCO has delivered to the participating member states and the Union as a 
whole.  
Capabilities programmes 
Whenever a specific capability programme is launched by (all or some) 
participating member states, a specific programme management structure will be 
established to ensure coherence throughout the lifecycle of that capability – from 
defining requirements up to disposal/decommissioning – with a focus on 
maintaining a common configuration, even when update-programmes are 
launched, in order to guarantee interoperability and minimise lifecycle costs. 
Decisions will be taken by consensus among by member states involved, with the 
EDA to act in support. 
Transparency and broader cooperation 
Transparency within the Union and towards other European clusters of defence 
cooperation, NATO and other partner countries will be pursued at all times. This 
transparency may lead to open specific capabilities projects and programmes to 
third parties participation.  
The Commission as a full partner 
The Commission, having responsibility for internal security matters within the 
Union and having requirements for dual-use capabilities, will be invited as a full 
member to this structured cooperation. 
First in line for incentives 
Within this framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence 
capabilities a central purchasing body will be created, entitled to take profit of all 
incentives for cooperation developed within the Union, such as VAT exemptions; 
access to R&T funds; innovative constructions offering multi-annual funding of 
cooperative projects, loans under favourable conditions, co-funding by EU 
institutions such as the European Investment Bank; ensuring tailor-made payment 
schedules for participating member states, etc.  
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ATHENA Mechanism to administer the financing of common costs 
associated with CSDP 
CEDC Central European Defence Cooperation 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU 
DDR Decommissioning, decontamination and reutilisation 
EDA European Defence Agency 
EDU European Defence Union 
EEAS European External Action Service 
EGS European Global Strategy 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
EUMS EU Military Staff 
HR/VP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission 
IMS International Military Staff of NATO 
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
ISTAR  Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation 
PESCO Permanent structured cooperation 
R&D  Research and development 
P&S Pooling and sharing 
SSR Security sector reform 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
WMD           Weapons of mass destruction 
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